Bringing together the various requirements that the three Tiers of threat have generated, this part now attempts to translate them into broad military capabilities. In 1000 words or so, that is a tough task, but the main feature is to look at it through the eyes of an independent Britain.
Intelligence and Counter-cyber
Essentially, such a capability already exists with the combined resources of:
- M.I.5, M.I.6 and GCHQ
- Army Intelligence Corps
- RAF Photo and Satellite reconnaissance capability
- Tri-Service Electronic Intelligence operations
This is not the kind of capability that can be openly discussed, and any new government would clearly need to review:
- Whether the size and balance of the capabilities was adequate
- Protections in place to prevent exploitation of data on innocent persons, and avoidance of mass surveillance
- That the different agencies and services (and other nations where applicable) co-operate and collaborate in an appropriate way to ensure maximum value is gained from each resource.
Nuclear forces
This is another highly classified area that cannot be openly and easily discussed, but it can be stated that the armed forces would need to provide the following capabilities:
- A credible means of providing a nuclear deterrent, whether that be an extension of the present submarine SSBM capability, or an alternative.
- A specialist organisation, to deal with any nuclear accidents, civil or military.
- All service personnel trained and equipped to survive as best as possible in hostile CBRN environments.
Flexible disciplined manpower, trained in dealing with terrorist/crime threats
To some extent, the military contains a wide range of skills and trades that when any form of civil emergency occurs, there are people with appropriate skills that can be deployed into almost any area of critical civilian work where augmentation by service personnel is required. However, the following conditions must be met:
- There must be sufficient “spare” manpower above and beyond operational and essential training commitments that service personnel can be given in support of a civil emergency.
- Where there are particular threats requiring special skills (for example, deploying armed service personnel onto the streets in the event of a major crime/riot scenario beyond police capability) that there are sufficient personnel trained in such a role in addition to their military role.
Home military-industrial capability
This is an area which is often forgotten. We used to have a very rich home defence industry, with multiple suppliers for each major type of equipment (aircraft, ships, armoured vehicles, electronics) but much of that capability has been diluted, impacted more by political job-securing vote-winning considerations than by military need. We are now down to the bone with in certain areas with only one aircraft manufacturer, one helicopter maker, fragmented shipyards kept alive for political needs rather than needing them to meet volume, and deficiencies in other area.
In his article, John Carins reminded us of how many British industrial companies have been taken over by foreign operators: Astrium, Ferranti, GEC, ICI, Marconi, Plessey, Racal, Swan Hunter, Vickers and Westland being Defence supplies amongst his list. When the chips are down, would a foreign owner continue to support British Defence investment?
A future government of an independent Britain must take this aspect seriously and ensure capabilities are developed, which of course will open up export opportunities too.
The ability to grow a substantial home defence force quickly if a conventional attack on UK becomes more likely
To be able to grow defence capabilities, a nation must have in place several things:
- The full range of capabilities in a balanced peacetime force, albeit some may be small. At present, our government has chosen to forego certain elements of that, for example, aircraft carrier and maritime surveillance, both woeful omissions.
- A reserve force that can be brought to operational readiness in time to meet growing threats. The present Territorial Army is being transformed and grown, but that strategy does not seem to be working very well. An alternative reserve methodology is to keep service personnel on a reserve commitment after their full-time service expires, matching them with mothballed older equipment, both equipment and manpower being re-activated where required.
- A training capability that can either grow or rapidly transform itself to take conscripts. One solution could be to resurrect National Service, albeit this is a controversial subject, perhaps best handled with a Referendum, and having a “civilian service” alternative for those who dislike the military approach.
Air and Naval forces to help secure our borders and to protect shipping and oil/gas rigs
Most people would agree that home defence interceptor fighters and naval patrol vessels have been trimmed to the bone, and cannot be reduced any more. On top of that, there is a glaring hole with no maritime surveillance aircraft to speak of.
A future government of an independent Britain would need to consider if growth in the size of these forces is needed.
Greater home production of energy, food and minerals
UKIP’s Energy and Agricultural policies already focus on this and propose workable solutions. I would also suggest that an independent Britain would need to resurrect our home-produced metals industry – freed of the shackles of EU energy policies and over-regulation, coupled with automation, our industry could become competitive again, and provide worthwhile jobs and export opportunities.
Forces as agreed for assignment to NATO and flexibility to deploy other forces
During the Cold War, large elements of our forces were assigned to NATO. Nowadays, NATO assignments are either provided by personnel posted to NATO Headquarters, units meeting NATO tasks, or deployments to expeditionary operations (e.g. Iraq, Afghanistan). If we are able to maintain the full balance of capabilities in a minimum peacetime scenario, then we would make a balanced contribution to support most future NATO operations.
Some expeditionary capability to defend overseas territories, factored on a cost/benefit basis, which might also be available to protect other foreign interests
The Falklands scenario is the classic and extreme case. On the assumption that a future British government would go as far as Margaret Thatcher did, if the Argentinians were to overcome our defence forces there, then as of today we are clearly lacking. The two aircraft carriers and embarked aircraft are the absolute minimum for such an operation in that sphere, but even in 1982 we were woefully stretched in respect of other Naval capital ships. Such investment would be a major decision based on a solid cost-benefit analysis, I am sorry to say – I would rather say that ensuring the sovereignty of 3000 British-descended people in the South Atlantic would be worth it, but in these stretched times different criteria must apply.
Conclusion
This series of articles has only scratched at the surface, but I would hope it has provided some clues as to how UKIP might approach formulating a credible Defence Policy to support an independent and confident Britain.
Brian,
I thought this an interesting and very worthwhile series of articles. Food for thought indeed!
On a more philosophical note it is easy, when enjoying a considerable period of relative peace, to conclude therefore that the threat of extreme conflict has evaporated forever. Secondly, defence capabilities, whilst also based partly on the preceding observation, always tend to address the last threat, understandably, and not the next one.
The pattern of human interaction and conflict over thousands of years should tell us that peace is always temporary and that those periods of peace are usually hard won. It’s inevitable, then, that future warfare will be different to past warfare. An example might be the Stuxnet virus that created havoc with Iran’s nuclear program.
We do need to be self sufficient, or as near as possible in energy, food and armaments to withstand siege. Critically and drawing from the maxim ‘never go to a knife fight with a knife’ our weapons program and its products should remain under wraps. Few might argue that the best way to win a war/conflict is to have superior weaponry. Following on from that it doesn’t make sense to develop such superiority then give/sell it on to others so our future enemies (when they become enemies) can use our technology against us.
People don’t start wars, politicians do. Ironically though the people fight them and die the politicians abscond or retire. All conflicts now need technology to get off the ground so principally any aggressive intent must have two major weaknesses; the leadership and their technology.
I have no special knowledge or insights but I could imagine that a fruitful area of research might include computer and biological virus delivery by satellite (by way of example). Just imagine if one could ‘change the mind’ of the leadership of an imminent adversary how that might prolong these periods when we can all live our lives in safety, prosperity and tranquillity.
On a more general level, particularly with regards to defence, I think the public need to know that we have a defence policy – or signs that we are formulating one.
I realise that our manifesto has yet to be published, though when Andrew Neil and half the blogosphere is busy repeating the mantra that we have no policies, some signs of life would be invaluable.
We recently placed an order for 14 F35s at a colossal £178 million per aircraft, in the middle of a depression, despite it’s many problems, costing half it’s weight in gold and dubious value to industry. If we are set to support such purchases then that is one thing. If not then championing the Fleet Air Arm, criticising it’s limitations or pointing out that UKIP does not approve of an aircraft designed specifically for actions such as Iraq or Syria would all have raised our profile considerably.
I was surprised that this passed without any apparent comment. Golden opportunity missed by our defence spokesman.
In reply to Gunnerbear. Buying off the shelf may deliver short term savings but ultimately it
will deliver dependency and loss of independence. Also,If we lose the
ability to design and manufacture the high tech equipment we need it
will not be easily resurrected. After WW2, the labour government under
Atlee still managed to keep Britain in the arms race. It’s really about
priority. Our current defence spending is historically low and on a par
with France. France seems to be more determined to protect its defence
manufacturers/infrastructure. We can do the same; it just needs a bit of
backbone.
Not that much backbone either. Buying ( admittedly rather nice ) trucks from Germany seems a strange decision.
I’m convinced that the defence budget has been used to bolster our EU credentials, both financially and politically, for at least the last decade and more.
Absolutely right – our EU membership is tolerated because of our expertise in defence. By milking this expertise It has provided the opportunity for other EU counties to establish their own high tech defence capabilities. The Germans spend less on defence are much less active yet manage to protect their military industrial complex. The fact is that we had to buy COTS trucks because we have effectively lost the ability to build them in the UK. Also, I can think of no substantial equipment that is used by the Germans that is British. The Germans of course will enter collaborative projects (Eurofoghter) to gain access to the technology that they currently lack. We never learn
And as the Eurozone crisis is bound to worsen I think we’ll see their leached defence capabilities sold off, probably to China.
Eurofighter of course was delayed by several years at high cost because the Germans couldn’t commit to buying yet wanted their workshare high despite a lack of orders.
A400 was procured on a ( rather high) fixed price contract with numerous clauses specifying punitive fines if the fixed price was not adhered to. Result was the price was not met, no clauses invoked and we’ll end up with fewer aircraft costing considerably more.
Voyager somehow managed to cost £10.5 billion for 14 airframes. Based upon paying the full list price for each airframe, any airline would have arranged discounts close to 50% for such a purchase…
Wildcat must be the most expensive small helicopter ever produced anywhere in the world. In fact I think the unit price is higher than the cancelled US Comanche programme.
Wherever you look in our dealings with European defence companies the graft it appears is barely even hidden.
“After WW2, the labour government under Atlee still managed to keep Britain in the arms race.”
A fair comment but then equipment costs were much, much lower as was services pay. As to short term savings versus loss of independence, I’m not disputing that but, when cash gets tight, most politicians minds turn to domestic matters and if the MoD gets £1 less as it only buys off the shelf….
…..then that means that there is £1 for somewhere else e.g. education, health or the Police.
I picked education, health and the Police / Emergency Services as those are the three things that tend to spring to the top of the polls when it comes to what should taxpayers cash be spent on.
Harsh though it may seem, I suggest that most people want a new school for their children or better care for their grandparents than the MoD getting expensive home produced equipment when COTS material is available.
Our “home produced equipment” (what’s left of it) is another country’s COTS. Let’s remind ourselves; the most important priority of any government is the defence of the realm. Maintaining our ability to manufacture in house is fundamental to the credibility of our defence policy. It is probably more important than say the size of the Army. It will be much easier and quicker to train new infantrymen than create from scratch industries capable of producing war materiel.
Certainly superficially true with infantrymen, but definitely not with NCOs. We have maintained a rather bloated officer corps for years in case of a need to expand, including TA officers who are unlikely ever to lead anyone in theatre ( they are almost exclusively hidden in staff posts if they deploy at all).
I say superficially because chucking a bod with a rifle into the middle of a muddy field and calling him infantry is certainly possible, though unlikely to be particularly useful. Even the infantry role is surprisingly complex and specialised at times. The job has probably outgrown it’s traditional recruitment pool – but isn’t attractive to anyone else.
The real limits to rapidly expanding the armed forces in manpower terms however lie in those whose skills are both perishable and in short supply. Pilots, technicians, engineers and the like. If you include logistics in that list, then look at the problems we have had when large formations have deployed, it becomes quickly evident that only very light infantry could realistically be turned around rapidly, by which I mean a year.
The gold plating of platforms designed to do more with less merely reduces the truly important resource pool, that of bods who know how to work together to get things done.
I don’t disagree. However, our armed forces are a “one shot affair” both in terms of manpower, equipment, materiel and means to manufacture. If we are ever placed in a position to fight any longer than 30 days our ability to manufacture will be paramount. If we can’t do this then logic says that we will be defeated. Because our forces are small then we can only gain an edge through technology/gold plating. Stalin said that quantity had a quality of its own, but in our case we can only go for quality. Neville Chamberlain that much maligned appeaser successfully bought time to permit British industry and the military to prepare for the inevitable war. That took 3-4 years- much longer than the time to train Servicemen. The next time we might not be so lucky. I would also argue that it was science, technology and the means to out manufacture Germany that won us WW2. (radar, spitfires, Bletchley park etc…….). The preservation of our independent industrial military complex is the essential part of our defence strategy.
All true, though the true shortage in the BoB was in pilots, never airframes.
There is a balance to be reached, preferably with an eye on export orders too. I suspect we can agree that a tiny pool of manpower exquisitely trained in gold plated platforms is rarely going to be the answer.
The problem is that, for the general public or rather at least those with no connection to HM Forces in any shape, the HMG / MoD procurement process working with UK industry always seems to deliver late and over budget.
For example, does this story ring a bell….
http://eureferendum.blogspot.co.uk/2009/02/seriously-screwed.html
http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.co.uk/2012/02/british-administration-is-to-purchase.html
….well it now appears that the Airbus is nearly, well sort of nearly ready for acceptance trials….
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2014/03/a400m-release-service/#comment-281679
….never mind actual service yet…..and I note that one of the commentators (Topman) on the TD site makes a reference to the Haddon-Cave (HC) report….
http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/hc0809/hc10/1025/1025.pdf
…not exactly a shining example of RAF competence to say the least.
“An alternative reserve methodology is to keep service personnel on a reserve commitment after their full-time service expires…..”
I was under the impression that already occurs as is the MoD…..
http://www.army.mod.uk/reserve/31789.aspx#
As to industrial production within the Defence Sector – how will UKIP deal with those who point out that much of the kit HM Forces requires can be bought far more cheaply of the shelf from other non-UK suppliers thus making each pound in the defence budget go further.
The number of people recalled from that commitment is absolutely minimal, and there is no commitment to remain current. I did not explain it very well, but I saw it more as retaining an association between these reserve personnel and the platforms they worked on, matching recalled personnel with de-mothballed kit.
For example, when you leave (to the reserve as I did) you are completely demilitarised – you lose your ID card, get signed off the Official Secrets Act, hand in all your uniforms and NBC defence kit. In a real reserve, you get to keep all that, only handing it in when your 3 (or whatever) years is up.
There would also possibly be a need to maintain a minimum amount of currency training, perhaps not as much as the TA (who are on 28 days), albeit there is a special situation with pilots to remain current. However, I suspect that most recently retired pilots would jump at the chance to get airborne again at weekends in their old steads.
It’s just an idea to explore
All fair comments but I do agree with you the whole issue of Regular / Reserve Forces interaction and related interdependences is a hugely complex area.
Plus of course for all I know, the re-introduction of National Service will be welcomed by all with open arms…but of course I’d add one or two tiny caveats to the referendum to really test the idea of support for ‘National Service’.
(1) National Service applies from 18 to 55 years old. After all an older chap or lady can always do a job ‘behind the lines’ can’t they for HM Forces or doing some other form of community work.
(2) or perhaps only let the 18 – 28 years old vote….after all they’ll be the ones forced to join and potentially risk getting their heads shot off in some foreign land.
Wonder if Nat. Service would be quite so popular then?
The RM doesn’t appear to have any issues with integrating TA in with the regulars, but then again their TA trains with the regulars in the first place.
My experience of integrating with a regular unit could easily be summarized as being viewed as an organic mine detection capability.
Remarkably few TA lads ever do a second tour.
“The RM doesn’t appear to have any issues with integrating TA in with the regulars, but then again their TA trains with the regulars in the first place.”
I think that is also true of those members of the TA that serve with the Parachute Regiment and the RLC EOD teams which I think reflects the extremely high level of professionalism of those regular & TA personnel.
Plus, as told at Chilwell, the MoD simply lost the reserve list not too many years ago.
With regard to civil emergencies this was a role that the TA performed, however it was cut. This didn’t change much on a day by day basis other than having to help the QM get rid of dozens of spades, picks and norgies. Apparently the issue wasn’t getting people out in times of emergency, it was simply that the civilian authorities didn’t know what to use the TA lads for even if they did call, which was effectively never..